This paper uses a SVAR approach to discuss the cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy in South Africa since 1994. There is a substantial South African literature on this topic, but much disagreement remains. Though not undisputed, there is a growing consensus that monetary policy has contributed to the remarkable stabilisation of the South African economy over this period. The evaluation of fiscal policy's role in stabilisation has been less favourable and there is little evidence that a countercyclical fiscal stance was a fiscal priority over this period. This paper considers these issues in an empirical framework that addresses some of the shortcomings in the literature, specifically: it constructs a structural model in contrast with the reduced form models typically used in the South African literature, it incorporates the dynamic interaction between monetary and fiscal shocks on the demand side and supply shocks on the other and avoids controversy over "neutral" base years and the size of fiscal elasticities. The model confirms the consensus on monetary policy, finding monetary policy to have been largely co untercyclical since 1994. On fiscal policy this paper finds evidence of pro-cyclicality especially in the more recent period, though the policy simulation suggests that the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy has had little destabilising impact on real output. JEL Codes: E320, E630
"The stakes in choosing the right monetary and fiscal policies are high" as Robert Lucas (2003: 3) argued in his Presidential address to the American Economic Association. Mistakes at this level cause inflation, distort decisions in the labour market and the accumulation of capital, and might either precipitate o r fail to prevent recessions. Lucas proceeded to calculate the potential welfare from improving fiscal and monetary policies to attain an "optimal" stabilisation policy and found that the potential welfare gain from such improvements were orders of magnitude smaller than the potential gains from supply-side policy reforms. Whether this result, and the associated policy priorities, also holds for South Africa is an empirical question and this paper contributes towards an answer thereof by estimating (i) the extent to which monetary and fiscal policies have been pro-or anti-cyclical since 1994 and (ii) the effect of these cyclical characteristics of monetary and fiscal policies on output volatility in South Africa.
Similar to Lucas (2003) , this paper examines the cyclicality of monetary and fiscal policies in an empirical framework that distinguishes between transitory "aggregate demand" and permanent "aggregate supply" shocks, building on the earlier work of Shapiro and Watson (1988) , Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Clarida and Gali (1994) .
Additional identifying restrictions allow us to disaggregate the demand shock into separate fiscal and monetary policy shocks. These results are described briefly in the second section of the paper, following an introductory section on the relevant literature in South Africa. A third section of the paper uses the identified monetary and fiscal polices to answer the questions about cyclicality of policy posed above. A counterfactual policy simulation is used to judge the potential gains from more consistently counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies in South Africa.
LITERATURE
Over the last ten years the South African economy has experienced a remarkable episode of economic stability coupled, since 1999, with the longest business cycle expansion in the country's history. Indeed a "great moderation" -as the improvement in economic stability has been called in the developed country literature (for example, Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Stock and Watson, 2003) -has apparently also come about in South Africa. The important dimensions of the South African moderation include:
lower and stable inflation, lower and stable real interest rates, positive and steady GDP growth and stable fiscal deficits and debt (see, for example, Aron and Muellbauer, 2005: 134-138). Figure 1 shows that the economy was considerably more stable during the first and last decades under consideration, regardless of the relative importance given to output and inflation variability. In other words, the 2 A loss function combines various dimensions of a problem into a single figure. In this case output and inflation variability are combined to form a single "loss" for society at every date. 3 The loss function was constructed by calculating, for each of the 4 decades shown (1965-1974, 1975-1984, 1985-1994, 1995-2004) , the ratio of the variance to the mean of real GDP growth and year-o-year consumer price inflation. The 3 loss functions have different weights, with the low inflation aversion using a weight of 0.25 for inflation variability, the medium inflation aversion function having equal weights for inflation and real output growth variability and the high inflation aversion function implying a using a weight of 0.75 for inflation variability.
judgement that the South African economy has experienced a "great moderation" does not depend on the reader's viewpoint with respect to the relative importance of output and inflation stability. Figure 2 is a cross plot with the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of annual consumer price inflation on the x-axis and the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of annual real GDP growth on the y-axis, with the standard deviations and means calculated with quarterly IFS data from Q11996 until Q2006.
international capital flows and trade 5 . Trade openness leads to lower volatility through a number of channels. First openness reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy as more goods prices become linked to the exchange rate, thus reducing the incentives to pursue inflationary policies (see Rogoff, 1985; Romer, D.H., 1993) . Openness also allows for a quicker recovery from external shocks (Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía, 2003; Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar, 2004) . Finally Cavallo and Frankel (2004) provide evidence that the possibility of a sudden stop is smaller for countries which are more open to trade. Secondly, the successful political transition during the early nineties, culminating in the first election under universal franchise in April 1994, has been associated with a marked drop in systemic uncertainty due to social and political factors. Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz (2001) provide empirical evidence of the decline in political instability since the early nineties. Du Plessis, show how potential output had declined precipitously relative to trend in the two decades prior to 1994, a process associated with the internal and external disruptions of opposition to the system of Apartheid and considerable instability associated to the upcoming change in political regime. The process of decline not only stabilizes but reverts after 1994. Aron and Muellbauer (2005) lists further systemic risk factors that have declined since 1994, including: the closure of the net open forward position at the South African 5 The extent to which the South African economy has effectively opened up to international trade and competition is a matter of some controversy. Fedderke and Vaze (2001) have argued that despite the decline in average barriers since the early nineties, the effective protection of large domestic sectors, such as the financial sector and mining, had risen over the same period. More recently Edwards and Lawrence (2006) disputed Fedderke and Vaze's (2001) with empirical evidence of effective liberalisation at the aggregate and sectoral level in South African since the late 1980s. This is consistent with Arora and Bhundia's (2003) earlier interpretation of the sharp rise in South Africa's trade ratio over this period.
Reserve Bank and moves towards more systematic fiscal and monetary policy. It is this claim that monetary and fiscal policies have contributed to a less volatile economic environment in South African since 1994 that is at stake in this paper. The remainder of this section summarised the literature on the cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policies in South Africa over this period.
Fiscal policy
Though the history of fiscal policy in South African since 1994 is one of extraordinary success along some important dimensions -such as stabilising the debt to GDP ratio, lowering the interest burden, achieving a considerable transfer of resources from richer to poorer households, and adopting a multi-year and forward-looking framework for budget planning -some of its dimensions allow for some controversy 6 . Part of this controversy -Weeks (1999) is a good example -is about the role of fiscal policy in stimulating growth with critics arguing for a more expansionary fiscal stance to boost the long run growth rate of the economy. But there is also controversy about the cyclicality of fiscal policy, or the claim that fiscal policy had become pro-cyclical in South Africa, as in many other developing countries (Frankel, Smit and Sturzenegger, 2007: 61) .
It is true that there is little evidence of fiscal policy being used as intentionally as a counter-cyclical policy tool since 1994 7 . Only three times since 1996 has Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel explicitly mentioned that the planned fiscal stance was adjusted for the economic cycle though the minister has often referred to the "expansionary" stance of fiscal policy since 2002. The explicit references are: the Medium Term Budget Policy Statement of October 1998 (Manuel, 1998) and the Budget Speech of February 2001 (Manuel, 2001) , both of which referred to intentionally expansionary fiscal stances, and the reference to a more contractionary stance as an appropriate part of creating "a check on emerging imbalances in the economy" in his 2007 budget (Manuel, 2007: 10) .
But automatic stabilisers could generate counter-cyclical policy despite the intentions of fiscal authorities, which leaves the actual cyclicality of fiscal policy as an empirical question to be resolved using various measures of the cyclicality thereof. The recent South African literature on the topic has seen the use of four different empirical measures, they are: (i) using a structural budget balance (Swanepoel and Schoeman, 2003) , (ii) the calculation of cyclically adjusted fiscal impulse (Horton, 2005; Ajam and Aron, 2007; Swanepoel, 2007) , (iii) an analysis of government expenditure (Du Plessis, 2004 ) and (iv) using a structural Vector-Autoregression (SVAR) to identify the fiscal policy (Frankel et al., 2007) .
Structural budget balance
There are different definitions of a "structural" budget balance. In the South African literature Swanepoel and Schoeman (2003) and Swanepoel (2004) calculate the structural primary budget balance after adjusting the components of government revenue and expenditure for ratio of actual to trend output. This adjustment requires an estimate of the output elasticities of the various components of government expenditure and revenue (though in South Africa only the revenue side of the budget has numerically relevant automatic stabilisers). A comparison of the resulting structural budget balance with the unfolding economic cycle indicates the extent to which discretionary fiscal policy has been pro-and countercyclical. Swanepoel (2004) and Swanepoel and Schoeman (2003) recently used this technique to judge the cyclicality of fiscal policy in South Africa since the seventies. For the post-1994 period their major result is that fiscal policy had often been pro-cyclical since the early nineties, partly due to the weak automatic stabilisers implied by their calculations. Swanepoel and Schoeman's (2003) estimates and comparable estimates for the OECD (Girouard and André, 2005) . Table 1 This evidence does not support any strong opinion about the cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy over this period and this result is the second notable contrast between Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007) and Swanepoel and Schoeman (2003) . An alternative computation is undertaken in Ortiz, Talvi and Sturzenegger (2007) . They provide a simple exercise which is to replicate the Chilean structural fiscal rule. The Chileans aim at structural surplus of 1% of GDP (recently reduced to 0.5%), where the structural surplus is defined by using permanent, i.e. cyclically adjusted revenues. To estimate these "usable" revenues Ortiz et al (2007) first compute the Lagrange multiplier of the Hodrick-Prescott filter for current revenues in Chile which aims at assessing how much the Chilean authorities smooth their income. The Lagrange multiplier that delivers a surplus/deficit that matches the structural deficit reported by the authorities is the one that provides a statistical equivalent to their complex rules to determine sustainable income. 8 They then apply this filter to revenues from other countries to compute their "structural balances". The results for South Africa are presented in Figure 4 which shows how South African authorities have reduced the structural balance over the 90s. In recent years, however, while the observed deficit has decreased and finally turned into a surplus, the structural deficit has increased quite dramatically signalling that the current surplus is the result of what could easily be considered extraordinary revenues.
Figure 4 about here

The fiscal impulse
An alternative method for distinguishing between the automatic and discretionary components of fiscal impulse is the calculation of a fiscal impulse, where the latter is defined as the change in the stance of fiscal policy due to discretionary decisions on taxation and expenditure (Chand, 1977; Schina si and Lutz, 1991) . This method also requires adjustments to government revenue and expenditure due to the effects of the economic cycle (and sometimes for inflation) to identify the fiscal impulse and it has been attempted in three recent papers in the South African literature, namely Horton As an alternative to calculating the fiscal stance and fiscal impulse relative to a base period as described above, Swanepoel (2007) calculated the fiscal impulse using a technique derived from Blanchard (1990) . Accordingly government revenue is adjusted for changes to the unemployment rate over time and the fiscal impulse is defined as the difference between unemployment adjusted budget balances for successive years. Swanepoel (2007) finds that the Blanchard fiscal impulse moves closely with the changes in the structural budget balance as reported in Swanepoel (2004) , and hence preserves the latter's claim that fiscal policy had been mainly pro-cyclical since 1994. The alternative base year and alternative cycle leads Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007) to 12 This measure of the business cycle is identified using a structural VAR with long run restriction in the tradition of Blanchard and Quah (1989) . different conclusion on the cyclicality of fiscal policy since the early nineties: The preponderance of points in the top-left quadrant suggests that the stance of fiscal policy has often been countercyclical in South Africa over this period. This is true of twothirds of the quarters between 1992Q1 and 2006Q3.
However, two observations lead one to interpret the evidence of countercyclical fiscal policy cautiously: first, the fiscal stance deteriorated sharply between 1997 and 1999 which was also the period over which the output gap reached its largest negative value 13 . Indeed, if the fiscal impulse (the change in the fiscal stance) is substituted for the fiscal stance in figure 3 above then the evidence of countercyclical fiscal policy largely disappears. Second, if fiscal policy operated successfully as a countercyclical tool we would see a pattern matching large output gaps with a large fiscal stance. However, there is no sign of such a pattern, suggesting that, even when countercyclical, the contribution of fiscal policy to output stabilisation must have been modest.
The cyclicality of government expenditure
Du Plessis (2004) followed Fatás and Mihov (2003: 1422) to use the ratio of government expenditure (without transfer payments) to GDP as a proxy for discretionary fiscal policy. But whereas Fatás and Mihov (2003) were heavily dependent on contestable assumptions about base years, elasticities, measures of the business cycle, a narrow view of the dynamics of macroeconomic relationships, a single variable approach to multi-variable problems, and are attempts at model-free policy analysis lacking benchmarks against which to judge the observed policies. This section proposes an empirical framework that addresses some of these shortcomings, specifically: it constructs a structural model in contrast with the typical reduced form used in the South African literature, it also provides a multivariate approach that incorporates the dynamic interaction between monetary and fiscal shocks on the demand side and supply shocks on the other and that avoids assumptions about "neutral" base years and the size of elasticities.
The model proposed here is a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) with long-run identifying restrictions in the tradition of Blanchard and Quah (1989) . While they used long-run restrictions in a bivariate model to identify aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks we followed the literature through Galí (1992) and Clarida and Galí (1994) with further disaggregation of the aggregate demand shock. Specifically, we use the 3-variable model described in Du Plessis et al. (2007), that uses the information contained in the output, government consumption to GDP and the real interest rate series to identify aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks and to subdivide the aggregate demand shocks into identified monetary policy and fiscal policy shocks.
A number of identifying restrictions are required to map the reduced for VAR estimated with time series data to the structural VAR which is posited as the datagenerating-mechanism. These identifying restrictions yield a time series of structural shocks for each of the three variables in the model as well as estimated for the parameters of the dynamic interactions that describe how the three structural shocks cumulatively and jointly generate the three variables.
The identification problem in this model requires three additional restrictions, which in the SVAR tradition are specified from theoretical priors. Blanchard and Quah (1989) suggested that long-run neutrality conditions could be used to solve the identification problem and their solution is adopted here too. The first two of these neutrality conditions separates the aggregate supply shock from the two aggregate demand shocks, i.e. the restrictions that the fiscal and monetary policy shocks have no long run impact on real output. The third theoretical restriction states that there is no long-run effect for monetary policy on the stance of fiscal. This restriction means that the real interest rate (the proxy for monetary policy) does not have a long run effect on the ratio of government expenditure to GDP (the proxy for fiscal policy), a condition which requires the assumptions that the preferences for public goods is independent of the interest cost. Secondly, the historical decomposition reveals the time pattern of the monetary and fiscal policy shocks which could be compared with the historical pattern of supply shocks and with real GDP. Finally, the model could be used to simulate the outcome of alternatives to the observed policy shocks to create a counterfactual with which to compare the observed history. This section explores the evidence from the impulse response functions and the historical decomposition, while the counterfactual analysis is reported in section 4.
Innovation accounting
Figures 6 and 7 show the impulse response functions for government consumptions (figure 6) and the real interest rate (figure 7) to the three identified shocks given the model. Impulse response functions are reported for both the longer sample (1960+) and the shorter sample (1983+) to lower the risk that the results are sample specific.
Figure 6 about here
The impulse response graphs in the first row of figure 6 shows that the government consumption to GDP declines in response to a positive supply shock, though this effect disappears over time (more rapidly in the case of the shorter sample). This is a countercyclical fiscal response to supply shocks, as it implies that temporarily government expenditures lag output expansion in response to a positive aggregate supply shock.
While the first row figure 6 shows a countercyclical fiscal response to supply shocks, the second row shows a mildly pro-cyclical response of government expenditure to a monetary policy shock. A positive shock to the real interest rate (a contractionary demand shock) leads to a mild and shortly lived rise in the ratio of government to real GDP, i.e. fiscal policy somewhat counteracts the impact of a monetary policy shock on real GDP. But the counteracting fiscal effect does not remove the intuitive contractionary effect of the monetary policy shock on real GDP, as is shown in figure   7 . Real GDP declines t emporarily in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Looking a the cyclicality of these policies by comparing the contribution of each shock with the evolution of GDP, however, is not entirely conclusive because to the extent that a monetary and fiscal policy tightening leads to a temporary decline in aggregate demand we expect precisely a temporary decline in real GDP which would be correlated with the business cycle. It follows that GDP fluctuations due to aggregate demand shocks and which are bunched at the business cycle frequencies, will necessarily be correlated with a combination of the identified fiscal and monetary policy shocks.
In order to explore this issue further, we would need to contrast the fiscal and monetary impulses vis a vis the other shocks (not the evolution of GDP that is influenced by its own effect), and in particular with supply shocks. Fiscal and monetary policy shocks that exacerbate supply shocks would raise concern that policy is exacerbating economic fluctuations. To examine this possibility the following table shows the correlation between the aggregate demand shocks and the supply shock.
Correlations are reported for various samples starting in 1984Q4 reflecting the period of modern market-based monetary policy in South Africa. Indeed, Fackler and McMillan (1998) show how to conduct use an SVAR to generate a counterfactual for a well defined policy alternative.
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